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Abstract: A secure optical communication requires both high transmission efficiency
and high authentication performance, while existing cryptographic key distribution
protocols based on ghost imaging have many shortcomings. Here, based on compu-
tational ghost imaging, we propose an interactive protocol that enables multi-party
cryptographic key distribution over a public network and self-authentication by setting
an intermediary that shares partial roles of the server. This fragment-synthesis-based
authentication method may facilitate the remote distribution of cryptographic keys.
1 Introduction
Nowadays, people increasingly rely on the network for daily communications,
which makes the data widely spread in the insecure public network and be vul-
nerable to eavesdropping and tampering by illegal intruders. Therefore, it is
particularly important to ensure the security of information transfer process
and the accuracy of identity verification. Generally, with inherent capability
of parallel processing, the optical encryption systems [1–7] can efficiently en-
crypt/decrypt information from multiple dimensions, such as the phase, wave-
length, diffraction distance, polarization angle, etc.
As an indirect imaging method, ghost imaging (GI) has attracted a lot of at-
tention in recent years. In the conventional GI scheme [8–12], one needs to build
a mutually conjugated double-arm optical path: one arm use a pixelated camera
to record the time-varying light field of the source; another arm is equipped with
a single-pixel (bucket) detector without any spatial resolution to collect the total
intensities of the light field that interacts with the object. Then, the profile of
the object could be recovered by calculating the intensity correlation function
of these two sets of synchronized sampling data. Later, computational ghost
imaging (CGI) [13, 14] was proposed, it used a spatial light modulator (SLM)
to simplify the double-arm light path into one arm, which greatly improved the
possibilities of GI’s practical applications. During this decade, GI has developed
many applications in the fields of lidar [15], microscopy [16] and X-ray radio-
graphy [17]. It is worth mentioning that thanks to its random fluctuations of
measurements and noisy reconstructed images, GI has become a new favorite in
the field of secure optical communication, including image encryption [18, 19],
cryptographic key distribution [20] and image authentication [21–24]. However,
few GI-based cryptographic key distribution protocols can reduce the sampling
ratio while ensuring the efficiency of authentication, without the help of com-
pressed sensing algorithms [25–27].
In this work, we propose a protocol for multiparty cryptographic key dis-
tribution over a public network and fragment-synthesis-based identity authen-
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tication, in a CGI scheme. Compared with the previous works [20, 22, 24], our
approach allows each receiver to simultaneously acquire different cryptographic
keys as long as both the server and the receivers are fully trusted via interactive
authentication. Additionally, with the help of an intermediary, our scheme can
determine whether an attack has occurred.
2 Principle and Protocol
As we know, the ghost images can be retrieved by calculating the second-order
intensity correlation fluctuation between the speckle reference patterns Ii and
the bucket signal SBi :
∆G(2) = 〈(SBi − 〈SB〉)(Ii − 〈I〉)〉
= 〈SBI〉 − 〈SB〉 〈I〉 , (1)
where 〈u〉 = 1
N
∑N
i=1 u
i denotes the ensemble average of the signal u, SBi =∫
Al
ISi(ρS)Ii(ρA)T (ρO)dρ, ρS , ρA, ρO are the spatial coordinates of the source,
the speckle reference patterns, and the object, respectively; ISi(ρS) stands for
the intensity distribution of the source; Ii(ρA) denotes the intensity distribution
of speckles; T (ρO) refers to the transmission function of the object; Al presents
the integration area; N is the total number of measurements.
The proposed fragment-synthesis-based protocol for t users contains two
parts: key preparation and public network distribution, key extraction and
fragment-synthesis-based authentication, as shown in Fig. 1.
Figure 1: Schematic of our fragment-synthesis-based cryptographic key distri-
bution protocol.
Key preparation and public network distribution
1). Initial keys sharing. The server needs to share two sets of initial keys
(i.e., IKa: a private key library of p× q pixels and IKb: N random 0-1 matrices
2
{Ii}, i = 1, 2, · · · , N) with each receiver through a absolutely secure private
channel such as a flash card and a U shield.
2). Cryptographic key preparation. The preparation process is pre-
sented in left part of Fig. 2. The server will design a regular binary pattern
of p × q pixels and randomly split it into t binary fragment patterns (FPs) of
the same p× q pixels, which will be used for later fragment-synthesis-based au-
thentication. Referring to the dark pixel positions of regular binary pattern and
every private key library (e.g., an unordered alphabet) that has an one-to-one
correspondence on each pixel-unit with corresponding FP, the server can easily
determine t cryptographic keys (CKs) to be distributed to each legitimate user.
3). Encrypted distribution via a public network. With the help of a
CGI setup, the server uses the binary matrices IKb to randomly sample each
binary FP image (as the original object), generating t sequences of single-pixel
(bucket) values {SBi}j (j = 1, 2, 3, · · · , t) in total, which are then sent as en-
crypted signal carriers through the public network.
Key extraction and fragment-synthesis-based authentication
4). Fragment pattern reconstruction. The users receive the signal
{SBi}j from the public network, and then they are able to reconstruct the
respective binary FP with the random binary matrices IKb shared in advance
by calculating the function ∆G(2).
5). Fragment-synthesis-based authentication. To confirm whether the
binary FP recovered by each user is trustworthy requires an authentication.
For this purpose, each user should send back his/her FP to the intermediary
(as a referee) through a private channel, and the latter can overlay all fragment
images together for fragment-synthesis, i.e., joint validation. If the fragment
synthesis result is a regular pattern (e.g., geometric pattern), the authentication
is successful.
6). Key extraction. After successful authentication, the intermediary
will tell the legitimate users the authentication results and return the fragment
synthesis pattern (FSP) to the users also through private channels. Then, corre-
sponding to the final FSP, each user can refer to his/her own private key library
to obtain the corresponding cryptographic key distributed by the server.
Deserved to be mentioned, since our binary FPs are carefully designed, there
will be no overlapped bright pixels in these binary FPs. If there is an authenti-
cation error, the intermediary can quickly tell whether the data has been under
attack. Note that it is very difficult to accurately locate the insecure user chan-
nel, so we discard these distributed keys and replace them with some new ones
once the attack occurs.
According to our protocol, we can arrange a server (which transmits the
signals through the public network) in a large communication area (such as
inter-provincial area, inter-regional area, etc.), and set up some trustworthy
intermediaries (which transmits the signals through the private network or local
area network) in the small communication areas (such as prefecture-level cities,
office buildings, conference rooms, etc.), to achieve multi-party cryptographic
key distribution.
3
3 Simulation and Experimental Results
To demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed method, we carry out the numer-
ical simulation. As illustrated in Fig. 2, for simplicity without loss of generality,
assume t = 4, four unordered alphabets of 8 × 8 pixels are generated as the
private key libraries IKa and four sets of 0-1 random matrices are used as IKb.
Then, the server will elaborately design a regular binary pattern of pixel-size
8× 8, such as a rhombus as shown in Fig. 2. Next, the server can split the regu-
lar binary image into four irregular 0/1 FPs of the same 8× 8 pixels. Since the
images recovered by second-order intensity correlation function has unavoidable
noise fluctuations, we apply an upsampling strategy, i.e., set ν × ν pixels of
the 0-1 random matrix correspond to one pixel-unit of the FP or that of the
unordered alphabet. This is equivalent to enlarging the fragment image ν times
horizontally and vertically. In this simulation, we set ν = 8, so the pixel size of
each random matrix is 64× 64, as shown in Fig. 2.
Figure 2: Schematic diagram of key preparation and public network distribution
procedure, as an instance.
The simulation results with the number of measurements N = 4096 are pre-
sented in Fig. 3. The designed fragment images are given in Figs. 3(a)–3(d), and
the original fragment synthesis image is shown in Fig. 3(e). In the key extraction
process of the previous works [20,22], some digits after the decimal point of each
gray value of the recovered ghost image are extracted to form a bit sequence
as the distributed cryptographic key, thus a lot of measurements are needed to
ensure the randomness of the distributed key. Different from this method, here
we smooth the recovered image (Figs. 3(f)–3(i)) to get corresponding binary
images, as shown in Figs. 3(j)–3(m). By superimposing the pixel values of these
four binarized matrices (i.e., retrieved binary FPs), we can acquire the FSP (see
Fig. 3(n)). Here, the result is perfect, showing a regular geometric pattern, so
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we can confirm that there is no attack and all the users are legal. The users refer
to their unordered alphabets to extract the distributed cryptographic keys, as
illustrated in Figs. 3(o)–3(r). Since the binary FPs are carefully designed with
no overlap between each other, the FSP should also be a matrix consisting of
0 and 1. If the recovered FSP has any pixel-unit with a value greater than 1,
then the intermediary can tell whether the data transmission over the public
network is under attack.
Figure 3: Simulation results. (a)–(d) are the four designed fragment images; (e)
is the original FSP; (f)–(i) are the results recovered by GI, and the key extraction
method is illustrated in (i); (j)–(m) are four binarized matrices obtained from
(f)–(i); (n) is the FSP calculated from (j)–(m); (o)–(r) show the extraction
process of distributed cryptographic keys according to four unordered alphabets.
When the sampling rate is very low, the binarization process can also be
realized by using a sorting method. To be specific, we set every ν × ν pixels
of the recovered images (the random matrix for the same) as a pixel-unit, and
average all the pixel values in it, then sort all mean values of one reconstructed
image in a descending order. By this means, if the legitimate user knows the
total number Mj of bright pixels in his/her fragment image in advance, he/her
can easily light up the pixel units where the first Mj means are located, on
a matrix of all zeros. To verify this sorting method, we perform some other
simulations as given in Fig. 4. Here, we set three 0-to-1 ratios of one fragment
image, they are 1:1, 13:3 and 31:2, respectively. For an amplification coefficient
of one pixel ν, the actual resolution of the recovered images become pν×qν. Due
5
to the unavoidable noise fluctuations existing in ghost images, directly use p× q
modulated matrices for GI reconstruction, the binarization process (smoothing
or sorting) will fail to work. But if we use pν × qν modulated matrices for GI
reconstruction, the number of measurements for recovering distinguishable ghost
images will be more than ten times the actual η = pν× qν pixels. According to
our previous work [27], the probability of the reconstructed pixel values locating
in the pixel region of the same original gray value obeys a Gaussian distribution.
Here, each pixel of the original fragment image will be equivalently scaled to a ν
pixel-unit. By using the mean of recovered pixel values in these pixel-units can
help reduce the total number of measurements. In our simulations, when ν = 8,
the subsampling ratio limits for binarizing recognizable reconstructed fragment
images are about 31%, 9% and 4% of 64 × 64 = 4096 (see Figs. 4(a)–4(c));
when ν = 16, the latters are about 9%, 3% and 1% of 128 × 128 = 16384 (see
Figs. 4(d)–4(f), where some details are even hard to be resolved). It is clear
that as the 0-to-1 ratio increases, the sampling ratio will be reduced. All above
sampling ratio limits were obtained from 100 repeated experiments.
Figure 4: The subsampling limits for the binarization of recognizable recovered
fragment images. (a)–(c) and (d)–(f) are three original fragment images with
1:1, 13:3 and 31:2 0-to-1 ratios, corresponding ghost images of ∆G(2), and the
binarized images via sorting, for ν = 8 and 16, respectively.
In experiment, we used a CGI setup to demonstrate this scheme, as shown
in Fig. 5. The light beam from the halogen lamp is amplified, collimated, and
attenuated to form a parallel beam which then illumines the working plane of
the digital micromirror device (DMD). Then, the reflected light from the DMD
passes through a convergent lens (of focal length 50 mm) and is collected into
a photomultiplier tube (PMT). We set ν = 8, and encode the 0-1 matrices IKb
of 64× 64 are encoded onto the DMD for random sampling. The frame rate of
the DMD is set to 500 Hz. For four designed fragment images (as the original
images), there will be four sequences of single-pixel values {SBi}j (j = 1, 2, 3, 4).
The GI reconstructed results are presented as Figs. 5(b)–5(e) and 5(j)–5(m), and
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their binarized results are shown in Figs. 5(f)–5(i) and 5(n)–5(q), with the num-
ber of measurements N = 20480 and 4096, by using the smoothing and sorting
methods, respectively. Although the image qualities of GI with 4096 measure-
ments are far worse than those with 20480 measurements (oversampling), we
can still obtain correct FP results from such a small amount of measurements
by using the sorting method. For this reason, we repeat the analysis did in
simulation and acquire the subsampling ratio limit of this experimental data
applying the sorting method, about 7% (286 measurements). This limit is just
a little lower than the simulated value 9%, due to the unevenness of light field,
which causes the central bright pixel-units to be more prominent (conducive to
sorting extraction).
Figure 5: Experimental setup (a) and results (b-i) with ν = 8. (b)–(e) and (j)–
(m) show the four recovered results with N = 20480 and 4096 measurements,
respectively. (f)–(i) and (n)–(q) give the binarized results of (b)–(e) and (j)–(m)
by using the smoothing and sorting methods, respectively.
4 Discussion
Next, we will analyze the security of this protocol under various attacks. Since
only the sequences of single-pixel values are transmitted in the public network,
the signal {SBi}j is the only place that can be attacked by the eavesdropper
Eve. Without loss of generality, we take the sequence {SBi}3 experimentally
measured for User 3 as the target of attack, and assume that Eve cannot get
any initial keys. Here, the used subsampling ratio for binarizing recognizable
recovered FP is 7% (the obtained limit), so the length of {SBi}3 is 286. The
reconstructed ghost image and FP using this unattacked {SBi}3 are given in
Figs. 6(a) and 6(b) as references. In Fig. 6(c), we also provide the fragment-
synthesis intermediate result that only uses three correct FPs of Users 1, 2, 4.
Here, we test the authentication results in presence of the following five types of
attacks: disordering the sequence, forging a new sequence to replace the original
one, changing some values (1% of 286) in the sequence, discarding some data
in the sequence (1% of 286) and setting some part (also 1% of 286) of the data
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to zero. Their recovered ghost images, corresponding binarized images and the
final fragment-synthesis results (combined with the correct intermediate result
Fig. 6(c)) are presented in Figs. 6(d)–6(f), 6(g)–6(i), 6(j)–6(l), 6(m)–6(o) and
6(p)–6(r), respectively. As we can see, compared with Fig. 6(b), there present
various errors in Figs. 6(e), 6(h), 6(k), 6(n) and 6(q), and the final superimposed
results as shown in Figs. 6(f), 6(i), 6(l), 6(o) and 6(r) are no longer binary
images, telling that the transmitted data has been attacked.
Figure 6: Results in presence of different attacks. (a)–(b) are the recovered
image and the resolved FP as references using unattacked {SBi}3 of length 286
which is distributed to User 3; (c) is a fragment-synthesis intermediate result
using only three correct FPs of Users 1, 2, 4; (d)–(f), (g)–(i), (j)–(l), (m)–(o)
and (p)–(r) are the recovered ghost images, corresponding binarized images and
the final fragment-synthesis results (adding these wrong binarized image of User
3 with the computed correct intermediate result (c)) under five types of attacks,
i.e. disordering, forging, tampering, discarding and zero-setting.
5 Conclusion
In conclusion, a fragment-synthesis-based protocol for multiparty cryptographic
key distribution over a public network with an authentication capability is pro-
posed. By setting an intermediary, this protocol can quickly judge whether the
transmitted data has been under attack, via FSP. Both numerical simulation
and experimental results have demonstrated the feasibility of this protocol, and
the performance under different attacks has also been discussed. This protocol
may offer a new way for applying the intermediary in optical secure communi-
cation, and will benefit many practical security applications.
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